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Speech of Senator MD{e Mansfield (D., Montana)
For Release on Delivery

BEYOi.ID Till MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Mr. President:
Thanl~s

to the \lork of the brilliant and indefatigable Deputy

Under Secretary of State (Mr. Murphy) 11e may yet extricate ourselves from
a very delicate position in Lebanon.

vle

deepening involvement in the Middle East.

may yet escape a costly and everWe may yet avoid the chain-

reaction leading to the great conflict, a chain-reaction \vhich uas risked
\then troops vrere put into Lebanon.
If

\le

come out of this situation in this fashion, vTe may count

ourselves very fortunate.
luck.

nut, Mr. President, vre cannot ahrays bank on

On the contrary, unless 1re build policies on sterner stuff, we shall

gaze over the brinlt once too often and one of these days vre shall lose our
footing.
That is \vhy I thinlt it is essential that we explore \·Ti thout
delay the lessons that are implicit in the current crisis in the Middle
East.

I think it is essential that 11e grasp their significance before

this experience, like so many others, slips into the dimming past, its
meaning lost to us.

I suggest the need for such an exploration regardless

of hovr we come out of the present crisis, whether the nation emerges unscathed or damaged to a greater or lesser degree.
Let me make clear,

~rr.

President, that I am not suggesting a

post-mortem on policy in the Middle East.

A post-mortem is hardly

possible on a policy vhich not only has not yet died but has yet to be
born.

\-!hat I am suggesting is that the intensification of the crisis in

the Middle East may afford us one more opportunity -- perhaps the last --

- 2 -

to bring a constructive Middle Eastern policy into being.
that opportunity then let us not vraste it.
policy gets underway.

If

\·Te

do have

Let us see to it that this

Let us see to it that it develops in a rational

fashion towards rational national ends.
I can conceive of no better way to begin on this task than to
isolate the principal factors which have brought upon us the present unfortunate state of affairs.

And, make no mistrute about it, Mr. President,

we are confronted with a most unfortunate state of affairs in the Middle
East.

In this connection, let me say that I can understand a point of view

which regards our predicament in Lebanon as necessary or unavoidable although
I may not agree with that view.

I cannot, however, see anything in the pre-

dicament to elate anyone in this country.

~t

best, we are in a situation

which will have cost the people of the United States countless millions of
dollars for our own military operations in the eastern Mediterranean and
Lebanon.

Add to this cost, countless millions more for emergency military

aid to Lebanon and write off the tens of millions in military aid extended
to Iraq in the foolish expectation that it would help to keep that country
friendly to the West.

These hundreds of millions of dollars \vill have pro-

duced, at best, a sullen acquiesence in the Middle East, a bowing to our
superior force until such time as a new challenge to us can be contrived.
At best, we will have brought upon ourselves an opprobrium on the
part of many people in the Middle East whose memories are scarred with a
deep hatred of foreign troops on their soil.

Thanks to the superb military

conduct of our forces in Lebanon perhaps this adverse consequence may be
minimized.

It vvill be minimized, however, only if these forces are not

compelled toiLunge more deeply into the Middle East, only if their withdrawal is fairly prompt and without serious incident.

\

- 3 That, Mr. President, is the meaning of the present situation in
the Middle East, at best.
mean at vorst.

I do not need to detail what this situation might

Clearly, it could mean a long involvement of American forces

demanding billions of dollars of expenditures over the years.
mean var, the great war.

It could also

These possibilities vere inherent in the action

vhich plunged us suddenly into Lebanon and they are still inherent in the
situation in vhich ve find ourselves.
We may have been shocked to have avakened one morning to the fact
that ve were involved in a military sense in the Middle East.

to have been.

\ole ought not

Events vere trending in that direction for a long time and

little was done to alter the trend.

The Secretary of State for several

weeks prior to the action had said that military measures might be forthcoming.
hood.

For an even longer time, the Senate had been aware of this likeliSome of us addressed ourselves to the problem and warned that unless

a more positive and constructive stand were taken, the nation ran the grave
risk of war in the Middle Bast.
These warnings went largely unheeded.

The Executive Branch

drifted along in the same pattern of the past, enclosed in the feeble
cocoon of the Eisenhower Doctrine.
from anything.

The cocoon did not protect anyone

It merely shut out the disturbing sight of the accumulating

difficulties in the Middle East and gave a false sense of security to the
nation.

Encased in the cocoon of its own fantasies, the Executive Branch

evaded the realities of the Middle East until it could no longer evade them.
Then when it finally acted, it was compelled to act in a military fashion.
It acted, in short, with too much, too late.
Our use of military force in the Middle East may be a positive
act but a positive military act is not to be confused with a positive
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On the contrary, it is the antithesis of such a policy.

The use of military force signifies the absence of policy or the breakdown
of policy.

In this case, Mr. President, it is the former.

We have not had

a Middle Eastern policy or, at best, we have had only the generalities of
such a policy.
It is time, Mr. President, to ask the ''why".
a constructive policy in the Middle East?

Why have we lacked

vfuy have we permitted matters to

drift until we were dra\vn in a military fashion into this region?
really the fault of the Russians?

Was it

Whether or not it was, it will make

little difference in the adverse consequences which will flow to us from
this act.

It will not do much good to blame the Russians.

The foreign

troops in plain view of the Middle Easterners are American and British, not
Russian.

It is we who are in the exposed military position, not the Russians.
It is time to ask why we are in this position.

It is essential

that we ask why, since there may still be an opportunity to set and pursue
a positive policy for the Middle East if we can answer the question accurately.

Mr. President, I shall not take the time of the Senate to review
the detailed events in the Middle East leading to this moment.
is not unfamiliar with them.
cance of these events.

The Senate

Hhat is important to the nation is the signifi-

What do they mean in terms of the adequacy with which

the nation's foreign relations are being conducted?

I think it will be help-

ful to the nation if out of our individual efforts to answer this question
some common wisdom emerges.
Each Senator is free to analyse the problem as he sees fit.

In

the interpretation which I am about to give to the Senate, let me stress
that I do not mean to be critical in a personal sense of the President and

- 5the Secretary of State.

It is true, they have primary and ultimate responsi-

bility in foreign relations.

It is also true, however, that decisions in

foreign policy stem from the work of many in the Executive Branch.

And it

is also true that >That is said and done in the Congress is not without its
influence in these matters.
If we ask ourselves how we came to be involved in this predicament
in the Middle East, I believe that we shall find a key to the answer in what
has been an absence of understanding of our national purpose in that region.
We have not had clearly in mind our over-riding interests.

Some may see

those interests in terms of the need to take a firm stand against the Russians
or communism.

But against whom, Mr.

now standing in Lebru1on?

Pre~dent,

are the United States forces

I venture to suggest that there is not a Russian

combat soldier within sight of the Lebanese frontier.
are not standing against Russians in Lebanon.
them.

The fact is that we

We are not even confronting

And I suspect that we are not even confronting many local communists.

To seek to relate the action which we have pursued in Lebanon to tWting a
firm stand against aggressive communism has the ring of Don Quixote jousting
,., i th the windmills.
If the stopping of communism can hardly be our over-riding interest
since it is not present in this situation, neither ought our supreme interest
be the maintenance of a sterile status quo in the Middle East.

I cannot see

what interest at all this country can have in preserving a stability compounded, as it is in that region, too largely of irresponsible and oppressive
governments, military dictators, social rot and economic stagnation.
ITor can the over-riding interest of this nation lie in supporting
this group of Arabs over that, or Arab over Israeli or Israeli over Arab.
Hor can it lie even in securing acce s s to the petroleum of the Middle East,
hm-1ever important that may be.

- 6 Our fundamental interests in the Middle East are, or ought to be,
the preservation of peace, the emergence of peaceful and popularly responsible governments, and the social and economic progress of the ordinary
peoples of the Middle East, Arab and Israeli alike.
which serve all the people of the United States.
which must be advanced before all others.

It is these interests

It is these interests

I regret to say that I have seen

few signs, except in words, that the supremacy of these interests is fully
appreciated by those responsible for the conduct of foreign policy.

I do

not mean, Mr. President, that these officials do not have an appreciation
of them.

I mean only that their actions do not adequately reflect them.

Mr. President, if we are to advance these supreme interests of
the United States in the Middle East we have got to have not only a full
recognition of them on the part of the Executive Branch, we have also got
to have an unbiased and accurate understanding of the fprces at work in
the Middle East which might advance or impede the interests.

Only with

that kind of understanding is there any hope of making intelligent day-today decisions of policy.
I have seen few signs that we have had that kind of understanding.
I have seen many indications to the contrary.
pression by the Executive Bramch that Mr.

One day we are given the im-

~lasser

is not such a bad chap.

The next day he truces on the appearnace of a monster.
sured that

~abs,

One day we are as-

as good Moslems, are communist-resistant.

The next we

are warned of the imminent dangers of communism in the Arab lands.

One day,

Iraq is billed as the most stable and progressive country in the Middle East,
ruled by friends of the West.

The next day the heads of our presumed friends

roll in the streets of Baghdad and, symbolically at least, our own roll with
them.

Yet, there is scarecely a ripple of protest from the Iraqi people.

- 7 One day we virtually ignore Lebanon and the next we are so concerned as to
land marines on its shores.

One day we condemn the British for sending forces

to Suez and the next we join them on a highly dangerous jaunt in the Holy
Lands.

Mr. President, it is not necessary to labor the point.

It is

clear that our actions in the Middle East over the past few years suggest
a headless policy with many tails.
stand this strange behavior.

It is not easy for an American to under-

How much more difficult to explain it to the

rest of the world which, having a very vital stake in peace, bas a most
proper concern in what we do or do not do in the Middle East?
I repeat this erratic course which we have followed in the Middle
East seems to me to stem in part from a failure to appreciate our over-riding
interests in the peace of that region and in peaceful, responsible, free and
progressive governments in that part of the world.

It seems to stem in part,

too, from our failure to understand accurately the forces at work which lead
towards and a1vay from the realization of these interests.

In short, we have

not known where we most want to go in the Middle East, let alone how to get
there.
Unfortunately, Mr. President, it has become too characteristic of
the conduct of the foreign policy of the nation in recent years to follow
the nevr adage:

when in doubt do something.

Apparently, the tendency to

follow this adage, Mr. President, accounted for the Eisenhower Doctrine of

1957. The Senate will recall that many of us had grave misgivings about
this piece of legislation at the time it was considered.
advanced press agentry.

We did nat like its

H'e did not lilte its constitutional implications.

went along with it because the President sought it in terms of critical national necessity.

We went along with it, notwithstanding the fact that it

vle

- 8 seemed to us to divert national efforts to a random pursuit of the communist
apparition flitting from one end of the Middle East to the other while it
ignored the inner difficulties which threatened the peace of that region.
vle

believed that without a positive policy directed at these difficulties,

our basic interest in peace would remain in jeopardy and our basic interest
in the peaceful progress of the nations of the Middle East would remain unattainable.

Further, we believed that the very danger which the Administra-

tion feared most vould not be met by this doctrine but might instead be intensified by it:

that is, that the nations of the Middle East would veer

more sharply towards communism.
I introduced amendments to the Eisenhower Doctrine,

~1r.

President,

in an attempt to bring it closer to grips with the inner difficulties of the
Middle East.

I sought to add to the effort which the Administration proposed

to make against the intangible problem of communism, a
meet tangible difficulties in the Middle East.

simultaneo~s

effort to

My intent, Mr. President, was

to turn the doctrine from an essentially negative holding action into a positive policy for peace.

Many members of the Senate advocated the same adjust-

ment of effort.
But the Administration chose to oppose the changes in the Eisenhower
Doctrine which were suggested in the Senate.

It was successful.

It suc-

ceeded in defeating, largely on party lines, two amendments which I

offered~

In retrospect, Mr. President, were these such terrible changes which I had
suggested?

I do not think so.

The first merely called upon the President

to take an international initiative in trying to curb the arms traffic in
the Middle East.

The second was an attemptto end scatter-shot and wasteful

aid to the Middle East by calling upon the President to trute the initiative
in developing a regional program of economic development which would be interrelated with the encouragement of peace and stability in that region.
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A

third, Mr. President, was passed by the Senate over the objections of the
Executive Branch.
think so.

Has that amendment hurt the Administration?

I do not

vlliat it did, Mr. President, was merely to emphasize the full sup-

port of the nation for the United iJations Emergency Force which was and is
the one bright spot in the otherwise dismal Middle Eastern scene.
There have been some press reports, Mr. President, \·r hich indicate
that the Administration \rill advocate at a summit conference, the substance
of all three of these amendments which were offered in the Senate to the
Eisenhower Doctrine,

along with other ideas since advocated in Congress.

If these reports are accurate, the Administration will do now, as a basis
of a constructive initiative for peace in the Middle East, what it objected
to doing 18 months ago.
I most certainly hope that these reports are accurate.

I hope

the administration will go to the impending conference fully prepared to
take an initiative for peace.

I hope that it will be prepared to strike

boldly for agreement which \rill embrace the following principles:
l.

The strengthening of the UH force in the Middle East to the

point where it can be used on any border threatened with military invasion
in that region.
2.

The curbing of indirect aggression in the Middle East whetre r

it be by incitation to assassination and mob action, border raids or other
forms of attack short of outright military invasion.

3. The mobilizing of international effort to bring about face-toface meetings between conflicting Arab leaders, and Arabs and Israelis, in a
supreme effort to make the beginnings of a beginning in the settlement of the
difficulties between them which have kept the Middle East on the brink of war
for the past decade.
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4.

The establishment of control over the arms traffic among the

nations which are in serious conflict in the Middle East, namely the Arab
States and Israel, in order to reduce the level of military tension among
them and to release the scarce resources now devoted to arms to the urgent
constructive tasks of the region.

5. The development of joint international programs which promise
to benefit all the people of the Middle East by furthering the rapid economic
and social progress of the region.
I do not lmmr, Mr. President, whether agreement on these principles
can be reached at any conference.

Whether or not it can does not alter the

fact that it is in our national interest to offer them.
terest, if only to make clear where we stand.

It is in our in-

It is in our interest, if

only to get clear before the world who it is that talks peace and •rho it is
that is prepared to act for peace.

In short, Mr. President, I hope that

there will be awrucened in the Executive Branch sufficient vigor, sufficient
drive, sufficient leadership and sufficient perception to get us off dead
center.

If there is one single factor which more than any other has under-

mined the prestige of the United States before the world, it is the negative
attitude that Branch has manifested towards efforts to get at basic international tensions.

It has acted at times almost as though it has a vested

interest in the perpetuation of these tensions.
The hour is late, Mr. President, but it may not be too late to
undo the damage which has been done in the Middle East.

vfuether it is too

late or not, it is still essential that we do not overlook a lesson that is
involved in the Eisenhmver Doctrine.

At the time this doctrine was before

the Congress, the Executive Branch opposed, as I have already noted, attempts
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to alter it in a fashion which would have laid the foundation for an affirmative constructive policy in the Middle East.

Even if it is prepared to go

along with such a policy now, note, Mr. President, the time-lag of 18 months.
To me, this time-lag suggests the absence of a clear understanding
of our supreme interests in the Middle East and a leadership firm enough to
assert those interests beyond all others.

To me, Mr. President, this time-

lag indicates an Executive bureaucracy grown so top-heavy, timid and torpid
that it produces neither the accurate information which is needed to understand how to act nor the receptivity to the ideas which stimulate the 1vill
to act.

If that is the case ve are in far graver danger -- given the kind

of world in which we live -- than any of us have heretofore suspected.
A way must be found and found soon, Mr. President, to cut the lag
between the time significant changes occur in the international scene and
the time our__p~~icl~s

-~~e a~u~~~~- t~--~~et__~ese

changes.

Unless i ~ is

~c~--~~~ld~

Y!~ shal~?_:, __in_ !_o:r_:=~~Z:_ :P_9.:li_~~ !or~ve~ _i~ p~rsui ~of th~-1~~~--step_ of_t_h_~ .

J,ast car of a train

tba~-- is ~va.ys

_p_ul:lin_e; awB:_y

-~~!ll _u~.

The problem of the time-lag in foreign policy undoubtedly has
something to do with the way in which the Executive Branch is organized to
deal with international relations.
that.

I believe, however, it is larger than

It is also a problem of sufficient detachment and skill to recognize

international realities as honestly and accurately as it is humanly possible
to recognize them.

It is also a problem of a willingness to come to grips

with those realities.

It is, finally, a problem of the courage to act on the

dictates of those realities in a fashion which will be understood and appreciated, not only by our own people but by decent people throughout the world.

Mr. President, I have gone on at some length disc1.1ssing the significance of the sorry experience which we are now undergoing in the Middle East.

- 12 There is little which I can add to the Senate's lcnowledge of the facts of
If I am correct, however, in my analysis of the

this particular problem.

principal causes of our difficulties in that region, then, the lessons we
may draw from this experience are probably applicable not only in the Middle
East but on a far broader scale.

elsewhere.
ti~s

For, if _~ere is

~ misr~ading

of

o~_Q_y~r":'..

I!__~~~:.:._~-~~s~fi c:_i_e?~--~etachm:r_:~~~- _s~i_l_~--~ .!~C:~gni ze -~-e:~l~-:: .

in th~- M~~~-=-~~~~~?_::._e_ _i~__pro~a~~?__insufficiei_l~_9-e~~_:bme~t__~<!_s_k~ll:_

as regards ot~~~-~:_:.~:_- If -~er_e J:~ -~--~-erio_~0ime_-:-_~~ in _F_<?lic~ in_!;he_
Middle East,__we

may_p_r_~~~~ - !hat

there are similar time-lags in policy in

other parts of the world.
In these circumstances, Mr. President, >nll we wait in Europe as
we have waited in the Middle East until we risk the loss of the chance to

-- --------

build a constructive peace?

-- - - - - - ----------·

Will we t·re.it with regard to the Western Hemisphere ,

until those who have stood ·with us leave our side?

Will we wait

'-~'i th

regard

to Asia?
The days go by st-riftly, Mr. President, and the situation does not
stand still in these other parts of the world.
many precious hours.
~~ace

throughout

We have already lost too

__gn_ce was a unique O:EI?Ortuni ty to

vJP~!-

bu~!_~~--~u!:able_

th_~ wo~ld has_]1_9~- bec~m~-~~best ~!_lly~ass!~ _C:!l~n_se_.

The Senate knmrs, as I know, that no nation alone can create peace.
But does that knowledge excuse inertia in our government?

Does it forgive

the continuance of the negative attitude ,.;bich has already cost us so much
in terms of the world's respect and trust?

Does it permit us to truce any

course other than to leave no stone unturned in the search for peace?

ITo

- 13 nation's stake in peace is grater than our own.

fJO nation IS quest Of peace,

That is why I urge, Mr. President, that we prepare ourselves to
meet with any nation or nations, at any reasonable time, in any reasonable
circumstances, if there is any promise of moving towards a more durable peace.
We \Till not be prepared for meetings \nth anyone, at the summit,
half-way up or on the bottom, however, unless we have constructive policies
which are in harmony with today's realities rather than yesterday's hopes.
\ole will not be prepared unless we have constructive policies,

policies which strike a responsive chord in the hearts of our own people and
in the hearts of others because they are directed not at winning hollow
propaganda victories but because they are clearly and unerringly directed
towards peace, not a peace of domination, not a peace of subservience, but
a peace which decent men and women in Russia, no less than in the United
States can accept, a peace with which decent men and women throughout the
world can live.

Mr. President, it appears that we shall be meeting, in the very
1ear future, in a summit conference which will deal with the Middle East.
:t appears, too, that there is some hope that the Executive Branch will
~ring

to that conference at least the beginnings of a constructive policy.

I think we can look to this conference without trepidation, even with some
tope of positive achievement, if we leave the press-agentry at home and go
i:lto it with some honest statesmanship.

I think that hope exists regardless

Of whether the Russians mean to have agreement or not.

Regardless of the fate of this impending meeting, it is time to
look beyond it.

It is time to look to other major conferences on the

Middle East and other \vcrld problems.

These conferences must come if there

- 14 is, in fact, to be a durable peace.

It is essential that we prepare now for

them, amongst ourselves and with friendly nations.
I go further, Mr. President, and say this.

If we do prepare our-

selves, if we do adjust our policies to realities, then I believe this country
will be in a position to truce an initiative for peace which will be understood
and appreciated by the world.

I believe this country can, and I hope that

this country will, call for the international conferences which must be held
on Asian problems and on European problems, on the dangers of accidental war,
on the whole range of world-wide problems which hold mankind, numbed on the
brirut of war.

I hope that we shall consider calling these conferences, parti-

cularly if the meeting on the Middle East reveals a serious determination on
the part of all present to leave the weapons of the propaganda war outside
the door and get on with the serious business of building the peace which
the world wants, 'fhich the world needs, which the world must have.

***
A few months ago, Mr. President, I expressed some thoughts on these
questions.

I believe they still have same relevance to the matters I have

been discussing with the Senate today.

I ask unanimous consent, therefore,

to include at this point in the record the text of four speeches delivered
earlier in the year.

